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Mutual insurance without trust 
Jean Hindriks, UCLouvain and Itinera 
 
 
The article by professor Jacques Drèze raises a crucial point about the tension between 
subsidiarity and solidarity. With short horizon, there is no chance for reconciling the two 
principles. This is static solidarity with redistribution and no insurance opportunities. But 
when there is a future to consider, with economic uncertainties, there is room for efficient 
future risk-sharing. I would like to make two comments on this claim. First future risk-sharing 
to be efficiently organized required minimal commitment. When we allow for risk-sharing 
with imperfect commitment, the conflict between subsidiarity and solidarity comes back. 
Second, separating redistribution and insurance is not so easily done in practice. The issue is 
where to draw the line between the past and the future when time is passing. I will now 
elaborate briefly on these two points. 
 
Regional insurance and Commitment 
Inter-regional insurance is fundamentally about sharing risk among a group of regions so that 
no region bears an undue amount of risk. Because of this, insurance can arise even when all 
parties are risk averse. What is necessary for this to happen is that the risks the parties bear 
are, to some degree, independent of each other. That is, when one region suffers a loss , there 
are other regions (or group of regions) that do not suffer a loss. While such independence is 
usually true of almost all individual risks for which standard forms of insurance exist (fires, 
car accidents, sicknesses ...) it is less obvious at the regional level. There are some 
fundamental principles in mutual insurance. First, risk-sharing is more effective the broader 
the basis on which risks are pooled. This is a consequence of Borch’s theorem on mutual 
insurance. Second, it is more advantageous for any region to engage in mutual insurance with 
other regions when risks are negatively correlated across regions. Third, there must be 
minimal symmetry across regions. The reason is that with asymmetric regional distribution of 
risks, some regions will systematically and persistently subsidize others. The distributional 
considerations will then dominate insurance aspects. Fourth, risk-sharing arrangements 
require reciprocal behaviour: a region with a favourable shock accepts to help out other 
regions if it can reasonably expect that those regions will in turn help it out in bad 
circumstances. With voluntary insurance, participants are free to opt out at any time and so 
we must also consider the possibility of risk sharing agreement without commitment.  
 Without commitment, complete risk sharing is not guaranteed. We must take into account 
the possibility that the region receiving the gain may refuse to transfer some of the gain to the 
other region. Risk-sharing agreement without commitment must be “self-enforcing” in the 
sense that no region has an incentive to defect unilaterally from the agreement. To be self-
enforcing, the risk-sharing arrangement must be such that the expected net benefits from 
participating is at any time larger than the one time gain from defection (by not making the 
transfer when called upon). If full insurance is not possible, it is still possible to design partial 
insurance by limiting transfers when the participation constraint is binding.  
We can draw several implications from the theory of risk-sharing without commitment. First, 
the time horizon will influence the amount of mutual insurance that is sustainable. Indeed 
the value attached to continued insurance depends on the discount rate (reflecting the time 
horizon). At one extreme of extremely short horizon, the value of future insurance is zero 
and regions always defect. No insurance is possible. At the other extreme of very long 
horizon, the value of future insurance is sufficiently high that full insurance is possible. And 
by a continuity argument, for intermediate time horizon, values, only limited insurance is 
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possible. Therefore the expected time horizon limits the amount of risk sharing.  
The second implication is that the level of risk sharing that regions can achieve increases with 
risk aversion. The reason is that regions put more weight on the gain from long-term 
insurance against the short-term gain from defecting.  
A third implication concerns the effect of regional inequality. Intuition would suggest that 
mutual insurance is more likely if regions are ex-ante identical and that regional inequality 
limits the scope for insurance. But this is not true. The reason is that risk-sharing redistributes 
ex-post from the region with a positive shock to the other region, but it does not redistribute 
ex-ante from the rich to the poor regions. More surprisingly, it is even possible that increased 
inequality, while maintaining constant the aggregate income and the variance of income, 
would improve insurance. 
 
Regional Insurance or Redistribution? 
In practice inter-regional insurance is organized in a federation through federal taxes and 
transfers. The effect of such a federal tax system is to redistribute income from high- to low-
income regions. By pooling income risk across the regions, the federal tax system provides 
insurance against region-specific shocks. However to the extent that there is ex-ante income 
inequality between regions, federal taxes also provide ex-ante regional redistribution. We 
ignore the stabilizing effect of federal taxation which refers to the possibility of smoothing 
shocks over time (between bad years and good years). The insurance motive for the federal 
tax system is explicitly recognized in many countries. For instance in the UK part of the tax 
system is actually called “National Insurance”. To appreciate the amount of insurance federal 
taxes can provide it is necessary to disentangle redistribution from insurance components. 
Redistribution acts on the initial income distribution, while insurance responds to income 
shocks (either permanent or temporary).  
Assume that regional income at any time is subject to permanent shock (with long lasting 
effect) and temporary shock. Both shocks are mean zero and add up to the initial regional 
income distribution. Thus regional income deviates from initial income distribution 
according to the temporary and permanent shocks.  Now suppose the federal tax system taxes 
all regions’ incomes at the same rate and redistributes uniformly total tax revenue to all 
regions. It follows that region at every time pays taxes proportional to regional income and 
receives transfers from the federation based on the average tax payment. The income change 
can be decomposed into an insurance part (smoothing shocks) and a redistribution part 
(based on the initial income inequality). Using this decomposition, it is interesting to 
measure the extent of insurance provided by federal taxation in practice. Empirical studies 
for the US federal tax system clearly suggest the presence of intra-national insurance. Though 
there is disagreement  about the exact magnitude of the insurance, all studies find that the 
redistribution effect largely dominates the insurance effect. They also find that insurance is 
rather modest in the sense that it cannot smooth more than 10 cents on a dollar change in 
state income caused by asymmetric shocks.19 As far as I know, there is no such empirical 





19 See Sorensen B. and Yosha O. (1997), Federal insurance of US states: an empirical investigation. In Razin A. and Sadka E. (eds), The Economics of 
Globalization, Cambridge University Press, pp. 156-72. 
